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INTRODUCTION 
ongressional plenary power has provided the legal foundation 
for Congress’s extraordinarily wide range of legislation over 
indigenous Americans,1 their lands, and their governments for more 
than a century.2 The Plenary Power Doctrine, developed by the 
Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century, has bolstered this power 
through highly deferential judicial review of Congress’s legislative 
acts.3 Despite the lack of a strong constitutional foundation, over time, 
Congress encroached deeper into matters affecting indigenous nations 
and indigenous peoples, regulating matters like tribal governmental 
structures, criminal jurisdiction and the manner of punishment for 
crimes committed on tribal lands, tribal land acquisition, gaming on 
tribal lands, the extraction of natural resources from tribal lands, and 
the settlement of land claims involving states.4 Congress has used 
plenary power to override Supreme Court decisions, abrogate treaties 
negotiated by the executive branch, terminate federal recognition of 
previously recognized tribes, divest tribes of vast landholdings in 
violation of treaty agreements, and involuntarily incorporate numerous 
indigenous nation-states, such as the Kingdom of Hawaii, into the 
United States.5 At times, Congress has realized the folly, or even 
1 This Article uses the term “indigenous” to refer to those individuals residing within the 
borders of the United States who have indigenous ancestry, whether they live in Indian 
Country or not. It uses the term “Indian” when referring to federal statutory benefits or rights 
conferred by Congress on a given category of indigenous people. It uses the term “Indian 
Country” as that definition is explained in federal statutes and cases. It uses the term “tribe” 
to describe indigenous nations that denominate themselves as tribes and otherwise when 
relevant to a federal statute or regulation conferring or recognizing authority held by 
federally recognized tribes. 
2 Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 
DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 204 (2007); Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, 
and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666, 669 (2016). 
3 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886) (first acknowledgment of 
congressional plenary power); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (“We 
must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the 
Indians . . . .”); see also Natelson, supra note 2; Steele, supra note 2. 
4 Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 213–14 (1984); see also Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 
(2012); Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5123 (2012). 
5 See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 331), repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-462, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1991 (giving Congress authority to allot and sell tribally 
owned parcels of land); Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (holding that Congress has the power to 
abrogate treaties with tribes); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 
C 
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tragedy, of its plenary power exercises and attempted to undo the 
damage with legislation that restored tribal jurisdiction and 
governmental authority, compensated tribes for the loss of their lands, 
attempted to stimulate economic development on tribal lands, and 
supported the rejuvenation of tribal governments.6 Yet, on the whole, 
Congress has expanded its plenary power in a variety of areas since the 
Supreme Court first recognized this authority in the early nineteenth 
century. 
In the area of environmental and land-use regulation specifically, 
Congress has used its plenary power to impose federal authority, 
directly and indirectly, over indigenous peoples and their lands.7 At 
first, this legislation related to ownership and control of indigenous 
lands—and specifically to the federal and private divestiture of massive 
landholdings.8 Later, Congress encroached into tribal authority over 
natural resources, abrogating treaties and authorizing federal control 
over tribal access to wild game, fish, and other species, as well as 
imposing federal oversight and authority in the areas of mineral 
extraction and timber harvesting.9 More recently, Congress began 
amending several major environmental statutes, authorizing federal 
agencies to regulate tribal air quality, water quality, drinking water, and 
mining reclamation (Tribes as States (TAS) provisions).10 The TAS 
YALE L.J. 1012, 1081 (2015) (stating that the Supreme Court in Kagama “claimed that 
Congress could interfere with internal tribal affairs at will”); Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric 
R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 149 (1977)
(discussing House Concurrent Resolution 108, which began Congress’s general termination
policy of revoking federal recognition, among other things).
6 See CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 278, 609 (7th ed. 2015). 
7 Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation 
Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 
WASH. L. REV. 581, 587 (1989). 
8 Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over Indian 
Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 922 (2012) (discussing history 
of reservation policy). 
9 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–68d (2012); Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–11 (2012); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533–44 
(2012); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740, 745 (1986) (holding that Congress 
intended to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt bald and golden eagles when it passed the 
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act); Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle 
Parts: Environmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 782–84 (1995). 
10 Royster & Fausett, supra note 7, at 619–20. Some of these statutes allow tribes to 
directly regulate discrete aspects of these areas under specific statutory provisions but only 
after satisfying federal criteria, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
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provisions, described in some statutes as delegations of federal 
authority to tribes and in others as recognition of inherent tribal 
sovereign authority,11 have been widely lauded for the opportunities 
they created in the area of tribal regulatory authority over 
environmental quality.12 It has also been argued that delegated 
environmental regulatory authority under the TAS provisions expands 
tribal sovereignty, particularly when exercised in a manner that 
regulates, restricts, or controls extraterritorial sources of environmental 
pollution (which tribes would otherwise lack authority to regulate).13 
Despite the enthusiasm that the TAS provisions initially raised, their 
value remains open for debate. They do represent the opportunity for 
increased tribal regulatory control in a complex system of shared 
jurisdiction and authority. Yet, the provisions themselves are an 
exercise of congressional plenary power based on the assumption of an 
unequal degree of sovereign authority between the federal government 
and tribes.14 Moreover, the arguably low rate of tribes obtaining 
primacy under the TAS provisions (at least on a percentage basis when 
viewed across the entirety of tribal and indigenous lands in the United 
States) calls into question the continuing role and value of the 
congressional Plenary Power Doctrine itself. Although the short-term 
goal of improving tribal environmental quality might be achieved by 
the handful of tribes that manage to satisfy the numerous criteria to 
obtain primacy in one or more discrete areas covered by the TAS 
provisions, ultimately, the federal government still controls the 
regulatory arena for the vast majority of tribes.15 
11 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 10.01[2][b] (Nell Jessup Newton 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (noting the difference between phrasing in 
statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act (CWA)).  
12 Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribes As Innovative Environmental “Laboratories,” 
86 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 806 (2015). 
13 Id. at 806–07. 
14 This argument may depend on perspective, though. From the tribal perspective, absent 
an express abrogation by Congress, inherent sovereign authority to regulate the environment 
is not lost until the tribe has ceded it. Therefore, some tribes adopt their own environmental 
standards outside the environmental federalism framework. See, e.g., SWINOMISH CLIMATE 
CHANGE INITIATIVE, http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/climate_change/about/about.html 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
15 City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 422–24 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 965 (1997) (allowing the Isleta Pueblo to adopt more stringent water quality 
standards than the federal standards under the TAS provision of the CWA); see also Royster 
& Fausett, supra note 7, at 612 (“Under domestic law, the federal government can exercise 
whatever regulatory authority it pleases on the reservation, either under its arrogated plenary 
power to regulate natives directly, or pursuant to the judicially created rule permitting 
general federal legislation to be applied to tribes.”). 
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Congressional plenary power in fact may be anathema to true tribal 
environmental sovereignty, particularly when it comes to matters as 
critical to indigenous nations as the protection of their lands, natural 
resources, and the quality of their environment. Also, for the 500 or 
more tribes who lack primacy under one or more of the statutes, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exercises primary regulatory 
authority over their lands and tribal environmental quality.16 
Congressional plenary power even determines the threshold by which 
indigenous peoples can avail themselves of these benefits conferred by 
Congress, with entire nations and populations excluded from the 
framework altogether because they cannot satisfy EPA’s regulatory 
criteria.17 
If the TAS provisions created a bright spot on the horizon for 
indigenous environmental sovereignty in the 1970s and 1980s, the past 
thirty years have dampened much of its luster. One of the reasons for 
this may be the slim legal foundation for the entire framework, which 
places too much authority in the hands of Congress and federal 
agencies like the EPA. The purpose of this Article is to examine 
critically the role of congressional plenary power in the past and in the 
modern era, the scholarship analyzing tribal environmental 
federalism,18 and the jurisprudential basis for Congress’s asserted 
power in this area. This Article will also examine critically the impact 
of the TAS provisions across the entirety of tribal landholdings in the 
United States,19 including some serious concerns for tribes in the long 
term. If Congress continues to use plenary power as a basis for 
regulating tribes and tribal lands, it sends an unmistakable message that 
federal oversight of sovereign indigenous nations is acceptable under 
modern legal standards. This imprimatur of acceptability undermines, 
16 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 555–56 (10th Cir. 1986); COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 10.01[2][a] (The EPA “retains implementation authority in 
Indian Country under statutes authorizing tribes to take primary regulatory control unless 
and until the tribes do so.”). 
17 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, §§ 5.04[2][b], 10.01[2][a]. 
18 See Kronk Warner, supra note 12; Sara Franklin & Rebekah King, Conference Report, 
The Nineteenth Annual Water Law Conference Watershed Management: A New 
Governance Trend, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 539, 543 (2001); Royster & Fausett, supra 
note 7, at 612; John L. Williams, The Effect of the EPA’s Designation of Tribes As States on 
the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, 29 TULSA L.J. 345, 358 (1993). 
19 As of November 2018, the EPA’s website lists sixty tribes with TAS status under the 
CWA. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ACTIONS ON TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 
AND CONTACTS, https://www.epa.gov/wqs-tech/epa-actions-tribal-water-quality-standards-
and-contacts (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) [hereinafter EPA ACTIONS]. 
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rather than bolsters, the legal character of tribal sovereignty, including 
the sovereign powers to protect tribal lands, natural resources, and 
environmental quality. 
In Part I below, this Article will discuss the history and rise of the 
Plenary Power Doctrine in federal Indian law and the sources of 
congressional plenary power and illustrate its questionable foundation 
in Article III of the Constitution. In Part II, the analysis will explain the 
environmental federalism framework and the special form it takes in 
the area of tribal environmental regulation. Part III will explain how 
the concept of tribal environmental federalism is limited by the Plenary 
Power Doctrine, both inherently and extrinsically. Finally, this Article 
will conclude in Part IV that tribal environmental federalism is invalid 
as well as ineffective and should be replaced with a framework that 
incorporates a more accurate reflection of tribal environmental 
sovereignty. 
I 
PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS: 
A CONGRESSIONAL EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY LACKING A 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION 
A. Origins: An Unenumerated Power Born of Necessity and
Circumstance 
Broad congressional plenary power over indigenous peoples was not 
what the framers of the Constitution envisioned. As the Supreme Court 
has observed, “the Constitution of the United States is almost silent in 
regard to the relations of the government which was established by it 
to the numerous tribes of Indians within its borders.”20 Yet, over time, 
it has become a settled principle of law that Congress has authority 
related to indigenous lands and indigenous peoples (all referred to 
using the term “Indian”21 in the statutes and case law) and that this 
authority has existed perhaps since the preconstitutional era.22 In the 
preconstitutional era, though, this authority was somewhat vaguely 
defined.23 The framers contemplated various forms of express 
20 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886). 
21 This began as an authority over indigenous peoples native to the contiguous forty-
eight states and later came to include the authority to legislate in all matters regarding Native 
Alaskans and Native Hawaiians, although these peoples do not consider themselves to be 
“Indians.” 
22 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[1]; Newton, supra note 4, at 199. 
23 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[1]; Newton, supra note 4, at 199. 
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authority for Congress to regulate commerce with tribes, and other 
matters, in the Articles of Confederation.24 The scope of congressional 
power in the area of indigenous nations was hotly debated leading up 
to and during the Constitutional Convention.25 Some delegates favored 
“exclusive congressional jurisdiction over all Indian affairs,” while 
others supported congressional authority over “Indian trade” only.26 
The ratified language of Article I, section 8, included the more limited 
power “to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes,”27 rather than 
a more expansive power to regulate tribes. This power later became 
known as the Indian Commerce Clause.28 
The Constitution makes scant reference elsewhere to federal 
authority related to, much less over tribes.29 The Treaty Clause gives 
the President authority to enter into treaties with foreign nations upon 
the “advice and consent” of the Senate, and up until the late 1800s, this 
included the authority to make treaties with tribes.30 As the Supreme 
Court has noted, “[t]he treaty power does not literally authorize 
Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing 
the President, not Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’”31 However, “treaties 
made pursuant to that power can authorize Congress to deal with 
‘matters’ with which otherwise ‘Congress could not deal.’”32 Although 
the Treaty Clause does not expressly enumerate authority for Congress 
to legislate in matters affecting indigenous peoples or their lands, the 
Supreme Court has held that Treaty Clause authority, combined with 
authority in the Indian Commerce Clause, gives Congress “plenary and 
exclusive” powers to legislate “in respect to Indian tribes.”33 
The scope of this legislative authority has varied over time.34 In the 
early years after the Constitution was ratified, there was a general 
principle that the Indian Commerce Clause, and other constitutional 
powers such as the War Power and the Treaty Power, gave Congress 
 24 Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 113, 127 (2002). 
25 Natelson, supra note 2, at 228. 
26 Id. at 227–28. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
28 Newton, supra note 4, at 230. 
29 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886). 
30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004). 
31 Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
32 Id. (citations omitted).  
33 Id. at 194. 
34 Id. at 201; see also Newton, supra note 4, at 202.  
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authority to pass general legislation in the area of “Indian affairs.”35 
While Congress operated under this principle, the Supreme Court was 
admittedly unsure of the source, nature, or scope of Congress’s power 
and largely avoided addressing the constitutional sources of 
congressional legislation.36 At the same time, the Court affirmed 
Congress’s own view of its power as broad, deferring to Congress on 
the basis that it should possess the necessary authority to accomplish 
the federal government’s policy goals in the area of relations with 
indigenous nations—even if only as a matter of practicality or 
necessity.37 In Chief Justice Marshall’s words from Worcester v. 
Georgia, Congress’s constitutional powers “comprehend[ed] all that 
[wa]s required for the regulation of [the federal government’s] 
intercourse with Indians.”38 However, many questioned Marshall’s 
expansive view of Commerce Clause power, “point[ing] out that the 
Commerce Clause, which was the only fount of constitutional authority 
available, could not give Congress power over noncommercial affairs 
with indigenous nations when it did not grant such a police power 
elsewhere.”39 
The subject of early congressional legislation was largely “Indian 
lands,” including the regulation of transactions involving tribal lands, 
removal of tribes from their lands, relocation of tribes (sometimes 
thousands of miles away), and creation of reservations.40 While 
Congress was passing these early statutes, the Supreme Court struggled 
with conflicting principles surrounding the relationship between the 
federal government and indigenous nations residing within the rapidly 
expanding boundaries of the territorial United States.41 On the one 
hand, the Court recognized that tribes were “external” sovereigns, 
possessing independent governmental authority over lands that were 
35 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[1] (suggesting that the Treaty Power, the 
War Power, and the Commerce Power are augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause 
and the Supremacy Clause in the area of Indian affairs); Newton, supra note 4, at 202. 
36 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886) (discussing extensively the 
various sources of constitutional authority related to Indians in the Constitution but 
struggling to find one that supported the passage of the Major Crimes Act).  
37 Id.; Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 
DUKE L.J. 875, 898 (2003) (“Holding that Congress had exclusive power over commerce 
with the Tribes was reasonable. Expanding that rationale to cover all interactions with 
Native Americans, however, was suspect.”).  
38 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Newton, supra note 4, at 202. 
39 Magliocca, supra note 37, at 898–99.  
40 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 530. 
41 See id. 
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within the United States but not a part of any state.42 On the other hand, 
there was also a general operating principle that tribes were at least 
geographically part of the nation and that the federal government had 
the authority to take tribal property, remove tribes from their lands, 
regulate commerce with tribes, and prevent states from encroaching 
upon tribal governments.43 For instance, in Worcester, the Court 
acknowledged that Congress had broad powers over tribal land while 
simultaneously recognizing that tribal governments possessed the 
exclusive sovereign authority to regulate matters internal to the tribe.44 
Although the Supreme Court did not clarify how these seemingly 
conflicting principles of law could be reconciled, the outlines of a rule 
emerged early on that internal tribal matters were subject to tribal 
governmental authority and that relations with external powers, such as 
the federal government, were subject to federal authority.45 This 
interpretation is somewhat consistent with the text of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress express power to regulate 
“commerce . . . with the Indian tribes,” rather than commerce within 
the Indian Tribes or within the “Indian Territory.”46 This was 
somewhat of a comfortable middle ground for the Court because there 
was no pressing need for Congress to legislate regarding purely internal 
tribal matters; the primary concerns of the federal government were in 
acquiring tribal land, which was a matter of external relations between 
tribal governments and the federal government.47  
In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, as 
nonindigenous settlers moved west, land fraud schemes emerged in 
which speculators were acquiring territory from tribes and selling it, 
often without proof of title and sometimes multiple times over.48 When 
major East Coast investors saw some of their investments evaporate 




45 Id. at 520, 557. 
46 Id. at 520, 559 (noting that “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with 
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of 
congress [sic]”). 
47 See N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 197 (2008). 
48 Newton, supra note 4, at 201 (discussing the Trade and Intercourse Acts, starting in 
the 1790s). 
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Nonintercourse Acts.49 These statutes clarified that the federal 
government maintained the exclusive right to negotiate land 
transactions with indigenous nations, barring private enterprises from 
defrauding investors and tribes alike with duplicitous purchase and sale 
arrangements.50  
During the first 100 years of United States history, if the federal 
government sought to remove a tribe or otherwise regulate an internal 
tribal matter, this was generally accomplished using the Treaty Power 
and left to the executive branch to negotiate.51 The reason was simple: 
negotiating with indigenous nations and procuring treaty promises 
ensured more peaceful outcomes and guaranteed that the military 
would remain free to focus on external threats.52 Treaty-making also 
created a somewhat more consistent map for legal rules separating 
federal jurisdiction and regulatory authority from tribal jurisdiction and 
regulatory authority.53 During this period, the Executive Branch 
negotiated with tribes, while Congress focused elsewhere. 
From roughly 1776 to 1871, the Supreme Court recognized on 
numerous occasions that Congress possessed broad powers to legislate 
regarding tribal lands, and perhaps in other areas of “Indian affairs.”54 
During that period, therefore, “the integrity of tribal sovereignty rested 
precariously on the whim of Congress owing . . . to the Court’s 
extraordinary deference to the political branches’ exercise of the 
foreign affairs power in their dealings with the Indians;” a whim that 
Congress could easily reverse at any time.55 When it appeared that the 
option of negotiation was not producing the results that states and 
nonindigenous settlers wanted, Congress did leap into the fray.56 
In 1871, Congress passed a rider to the Appropriations Act of 
1871.57 The rider declared that, after 1871, “[n]o Indian nation or tribe, 
49 David M. Schraver & David H. Tennant, Indian Tribal Sovereignty—Current Issues, 
75 ALB. L. REV. 133, 139–40 (2012) (describing the history of the Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Acts).  
50 Id. 
51 Newton, supra note 4, at 200.  
52 Id. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 205. 
56 DUTHU, supra note 47, at 200 (noting that “[d]emand for Indian land and resources, 
fed by the growing sense of entitlement that would later flourish under the banner of 
manifest destiny, and a pretty toxic brew of racism toward Indians and their ‘primitive’ ways 
of life . . . helped fuel the shift in national policy”). 
57 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886); DUTHU, supra note 47, at 200. 
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within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or 
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty.”58 The historical context for this 
legislation was the end of the policy of removing tribes to the west, into 
what are now the states of Kansas and Oklahoma, and out of the way 
of non-native settlers seeking to occupy their lands.59 After the rider 
passed, as a matter of federal law, tribes would not be treated as entirely 
separate sovereign entities; they would be absorbed into and made 
subject to relevant state and federal laws.60 
After 1871, Congress legislated more extensively over matters that 
had previously been negotiated by the executive branch through 
treaties, asserting more comprehensive authority over tribal 
governments, tribal territories, and tribal members.61 Tribal members 
thereafter became “subjects to be governed [by the United States 
federal government], rather than foreign nationals,” governed by their 
own national bodies and independent of the federal legal system.62 One 
example of this new, expanded authority was the Major Crimes Act, 
which Congress passed to unilaterally impose federal jurisdiction 
over serious crimes committed by “Indian[s] . . . within . . . Indian 
country.”63 Prior to its passage, only tribal authority had governed 
these crimes.64 
58 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382 (citation omitted). 
59 Newton, supra note 4, at 205 (noting that the policy was ending essentially because 
all the tribes that removed themselves voluntarily, or the ones that the federal government 
could force out, had gone, and the small populations that remained could, in the eyes of the 
federal government, be forcibly assimilated into the general American citizenry).  
60 Id. at 206. The problem with the line of congressional reasoning was that many tribes 
had executed prior treaties guaranteeing them certain governmental authority and certain 
autonomous rights, and the Supreme Court continued to recognize these treaty guarantees 
after 1871. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 18.07[1] (citing FPC v. Tuscarora 
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)). 
61 Newton, supra note 4, at 206. 
62 Id. After 1871, the executive branch still negotiated agreements with tribes, which 
were then made effective by legislation, not a formal treaty. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 11, § 5.01[2]. The 1871 amendments, however, caused a seismic shift in the nature of 
the relationship between the federal government and tribes because Congress began to pass 
legislation that encroached upon purely internal tribal matters, such as the Major Crimes 
Act, the General Allotment Act. Those statutes certainly were not the result of negotiation 
between tribes and the federal government and were not based on a model of consent. See 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 45, 76–77 
(2012). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). 
64 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[4]; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 
90.
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When the Major Crimes Act was challenged, the Supreme Court 
faced the difficult question of determining whether Congress’s plenary 
power truly extended beyond land acquisition and purely external tribal 
matters into the heart of an essential tribal governmental function—the 
prosecution of crimes and assertion of criminal jurisdiction.65 In United 
States v. Kagama, the Court answered this question in the affirmative.66 
Normally, a challenge to the legitimacy of a statute would require the 
Court to examine its constitutionality.67 However, it was clear to the 
Court, after an initial examination of the potential sources of 
constitutional authority in the parties’ arguments, that something else 
might be required to evaluate the Major Crimes Act.68 This was 
because the scant references to Indians or tribes in the Constitution did 
not provide a solid legal rationale for upholding this statute, which 
asserted federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members, inside tribal 
nations, and on tribal land.69 The reference in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “Indians not taxed” did not “shed much light” on the 
matter, but the Indian Commerce Clause, which was the primary basis 
for the government’s argument that the statute was constitutional, 
seemed slightly more promising to the Court.70 A plain reading of the 
text, however, led the Justices to conclude that 
it would be a very strained construction of this clause that a system 
of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, 
which left out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly 
enacted under that provision, and established punishments for the 
common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, 
larceny, and the like, without any reference to their relation to any 
kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant of power to regulate 
commerce with the Indian tribes.71 
Having concluded that the Indian Commerce Clause provided no 
support for the legislation, the Court looked to the Property Clause.72 
Alone, the Property Clause limited Congress to making “needful” 
regulations over federal land and, like the Commerce Clause, did not 
encompass prosecutorial authority or criminal jurisdiction on sovereign 
65 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1986).  
66 Id. 
67 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 
91. 
68 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 378–79. 
72 Id. at 379. 
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tribal lands.73 However, in addition to the general power to pass 
legislation acquiring, disposing of, and regulating the use of federal 
land, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress also had power over 
United States territories that was more extensive than the power over 
federal lands that had already become part of admitted states.74 This 
general power of Congress to make laws related to territories and their 
occupants (a power that previously had been exercised only with 
respect to inhabitants of states, prior to admission) arose, in the Court’s 
view, “from the ownership of the country in which the territories are, 
and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national 
government, and [could] be found nowhere else.”75 
This issue of federal ownership of tribal lands and the corresponding 
notion of federal “exclusive sovereignty” over those lands in Kagama 
raised a question about the foundation for those principles, since they 
conflicted with the earlier cases acknowledging tribal sovereignty over 
tribal members and tribal lands.76 The primary question was whether 
tribal lands were federal or not.77 That question, in turn, invoked the 
Doctrine of Discovery, announced by Justice Marshall in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh.78 According to this doctrine, “discovery” of land by a 
European sovereign established exclusive rights to settlement and 
development in that sovereign, although the indigenous nations 
retained rights to occupy their lands, which the Court also described as 
“sovereign” rights.79 The doctrine therefore established corollary rights 
to the same land in the United States and tribes, in other words, and 
recognized dual forms of sovereign authority over the same territory.80 
Under the Doctrine of Discovery, the United States—as successor in 
interest to Great Britain and the other European nations who originally 
landed and established claims in the Americas—could inherit 
sovereign powers over territories already “discovered” by European 
powers and establish exclusive authority and control over them, 
through purchase or by force.81 As for the tribes, 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 380. 
76 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 521 (1832). 
77 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380–81. 
78 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
79 Id. at 583–84. 
80 Id. at 587. 
81 Id. at 573–74. 
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[t]hey were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it
according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished,
and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.82
Because tribal sovereignty was “diminished,” not “divested,” the Court 
concluded that tribes retained some sovereign powers.83 
Justice Marshall did not clarify the meaning and scope of this 
diminished sovereignty, although a few parameters can be gleaned 
from what Marshall determined the tribes had lost. In Marshall’s view, 
tribal sovereignty did not encompass absolute ownership of tribal 
lands.84 Tribal sovereignty also did not include total “dominion,” or 
control, over tribal lands—this was held by the “discovering” sovereign 
or, eventually, by any successor nonindigenous government, such as 
the United States.85 The tribes’ diminished form of sovereignty did not 
allow them to exclude the United States, but it did include a duty of 
protection owed by the United States to the tribes, particularly from the 
ever-encroaching states.86 Therefore, indigenous nations retained 
sovereign authority, especially within their borders, even after 
Johnson. 
Over time, the Court would use the Doctrine of Discovery to 
recognize increasing congressional legislative authority over 
indigenous lands, even when the factual circumstances underlying the 
legislation were distinguishable from those in Georgia in the early 
nineteenth century.87 In Kagama, for instance, when the Court could 
not find an enumerated source of constitutional authority for Congress 
to pass the Major Crimes Act, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller cobbled 
together a rationale using the Doctrine of Discovery, which placed all 
tribal lands under the authority and control of the federal government, 
and Congress’s general authority to pass legislation concerning all 
territories within the borders of the United States to reach the 
82 Id. at 574. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. at 586 (As Chief Justice Marshall noted in the Johnson opinion, “The ceded 
territory [by the States, to the federal government] was occupied by numerous and warlike 
tribes of Indians; but the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, and to 
grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted.”). 
85 Id. at 579. 
86 Id. at 594. 
87 Newton, supra note 4, at 210. 
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conclusion that Congress possessed inherent power to enact criminal 
legislation governing tribal lands and their occupants.88 Yet, Justice 
Miller failed to explain how sovereign indigenous lands were 
analogous to territories in reaching that conclusion, omitted entirely the 
prior nature of the relationship between tribes and the federal 
government (as separate sovereigns negotiating with one another at 
arm’s length using treaties), and otherwise fell short of the level of 
reasoning that might be expected to support such a broad expansion of 
congressional power.89  
However, the analysis did not end there. The Court found a second 
rationale supporting the decision in Kagama: the legislation was 
necessary to impose federal control over serious crimes committed in 
Indian Country.90 This element of the holding derived from the federal 
government’s view of indigenous peoples at this time as “weak[],” 
“helpless[],” in need of aid, and effectively “wards of the nation.”91 
The Court acknowledged that this factual basis for the holding—the 
weak and diminished state of indigenous nations—was largely a result 
of the unilateral exercise of governmental power that the holding 
affirmed, creating a circular line of reasoning in which the Court used 
past consequences of congressional acts of plenary power to justify the 
validity of the Major Crimes Act and, by extension, the continuing 
assertion of plenary power.92 
This confusing line of reasoning continued into the late 1800s when 
the Court finally acknowledged that congressional plenary power was 
not an enumerated constitutional power, making plenary power 
something of a congressional inherent power even though the Court 
generally declined to recognize that Congress possessed inherent, 
unenumerated powers in other contexts.93 According to the Court, it 
88 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1986). 
89 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[4]; Newton, supra note 4, at 214–15. 
90 Newton, supra note 4, at 212–13. 
91 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.; M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adopted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit 
of the constitution, are constitutional.”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[4] 
(suggesting that this notion of inherent congressional power is “analogous to that asserted 
in the field of international affairs in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: That 
national power in Indian affairs descended to the national government from Great Britain 
and therefore does not require an explicit grant of power in the Constitution for its exercise,” 
but noting that this theory “has been criticized in the field of international law, however, and 
368 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 353 
was simply “valid” for Congress to legislate in this area, and the Court 
granted Congress wide deference to do so, even implementing a 
standard of review that instructed courts to presume that Congress 
acted “in perfect good faith” when passing legislation related to 
indigenous peoples and their lands.94 
In part, the Court justified the principle that became the Plenary 
Power Doctrine, and the extreme judicial deference it invoked, using 
the national government’s need to consolidate federal power over 
territory rather than a measured consideration of the constitutionality 
of the doctrine itself.95 As historians have noted, at the time the doctrine 
really began to crystallize and judicial deference was at its apex, the 
United States was expanding at a feverish pace—determined to settle 
and occupy the lands acquired from France (the Louisiana Purchase), 
Mexico (after the Mexican-American War), Russia (purchase of 
Alaska) and annex island nations such as Cuba, the Philippines, and 
Hawaii.96 When conflicts arose in the course of these territorial 
expansions, the Supreme Court deferred to the other branches and 
declined to place any true limits on their implementation of Manifest 
Destiny.97 The Plenary Power Doctrine was an essential piece of this 
colonialist impulse, and the federal government badly needed it to 
rationalize the removal of indigenous peoples, whose presence 
impeded the expansion of the nonindigenous population.98 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock exemplifies this tension.99 In Lone Wolf, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the validity of Congress’s ratification of a 
fraudulently obtained treaty agreement between the Kiowa, Comanche, 
and Apache Nations and the federal government in which the tribes 
allegedly ceded more than 2.1 million acres of land to the federal 
government, which the Department of Interior proceeded to place for 
sale to nontribal settlers.100 The tribes sued to enjoin the sales, arguing 
that the statute authorizing them was invalid because it was based upon 
a fraudulent treaty agreement signed by less than the minimum 
should be avoided in the field of Indian affairs as well.”); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, 
at 91 (“Basic American constitutional law requires that exercises of congressional power be 
rooted in a textual grant of power to Congress reflected in the text of the United States 
Constitution.”); Newton, supra note 4, at 208–09. 
94 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903); see Newton, supra note 4, at 217. 
95 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 91. 
96 Id. 
97 Newton, supra note 4, at 221–22. 
98 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 91. 
99 187 U.S. 553; Newton, supra note 4, at 221. 
100 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 555. 
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percentage of tribal members required by a prior treaty (the Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge).101 The Court faced two choices: invalidating the 
legislation authorizing the sale (because it violated the earlier treaty) or 
finding the statute to be valid (despite the earlier treaty agreements).102 
Choosing the former path would recognize the validity of the Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge and, at least implicitly, condemn the invalidity of 
congressional legislation based upon a fraudulent treaty modification, 
effectively ruling in favor of a validly executed treaty over an invalidly 
executed one.103 Choosing the latter would recognize the plenary 
power of Congress to breach a treaty and unilaterally deprive tribes of 
extensive landholdings, affirming the power of Congress to 
legislatively undermine valid constitutional acts of the executive 
branch.104 
The Court chose the latter path—abrogation—and sent a clear 
message about the legal validity of treaties and Congress’s new and 
expansive powers over tribal members, tribal territory, and tribal 
governments.105 In dismissing the tribes’ argument that the legislation 
authorizing the land sale was a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution, the Court noted the following: 
To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation 
of the treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling 
authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the 
Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when the 
necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the tribal 
lands, of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be 
obtained.106 
Even though the Court revisited principles from earlier cases 
acknowledging tribal sovereignty over tribal territory and the nature of 
the tribes’ sacred title, which the Court recognized “as sacred as the fee 
of the United States in the same lands,” neither of those principles could 
overcome this new notion of congressional plenary authority, 
especially in situations deemed to be “emergencies” by the federal 
government.107 Moreover, this authority was subject to virtually no 
101 Id. at 556. Some of the signatures were also fraudulent, having been penned by 
federal government officials, rather than adult male tribal members. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 556–57. 
106 Id. at 564. 
107 Id. 
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judicial scrutiny, with the Court reasoning that “[p]lenary authority 
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress 
from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political 
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the 
government.”108 Furthermore, the Court noted the following: 
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, 
though presumably such power will be exercised only when 
circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in 
disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the 
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do 
so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United 
States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to 
abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power 
might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy, 
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the 
Indians.109 
Even though the tribal members had argued and demonstrated bad faith 
on the part of the Secretary of the Interior and of Congress (in 
disregarding the fraudulent factual basis for the legislation authorizing 
the sale), the Court refused to address the merits of those arguments 
because they “were solely within the domain of the legislative 
authority” and that legislative authority—Congress—was deemed to 
have acted in “perfect good faith” toward the tribes.110 
It is hard to envision a case with a more persuasive set of facts for 
any tribe than in Lone Wolf—a prior treaty, fraudulent negotiations to 
modify it, miscommunications by representatives of the Secretary to 
Congress, and thus an invalid legislative record supporting subsequent 
legislation authorizing a partition and sale of tribal lands.111 In light of 
precedent at the time, such as Worcester v. Georgia, the tribes had the 
stronger legal arguments.112 Only the newly formed Plenary Power 
Doctrine supported Congress’s power to enact legislation affecting 
tribal land, but the federal government and the new Doctrine 
prevailed.113 In the eyes of the Court, it was time to finish off any 
remaining vestiges of doubt about Congress’s unilateral power over 
Indian affairs, lest tribes, settlers, or anyone else remain convinced that 
treaties negotiated by the executive branch were the “supreme law of 
108 Id. at 565. 
109 Id. at 566. 
110 Id. at 568. 
111 See id. 
112 Id. at 564–65. 
113 Id. 
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the land.”114 If Congress took aim, the Court now had precedent 
supporting the principle that treaties sometimes must yield.115 
After Lone Wolf, tribes began to turn to Congress to resolve their 
land claims and other problems that arose from the removal and 
reservation era.116 This case was a turning point for Congress as well, 
bolstering support for Congress to exercise authority over broad new 
areas of legislation in Indian Country. For the next century, Congress 
passed statutes regulating practically anything and everything tribal—
from the areas of land use and environmental regulation to mineral 
development, tribal jurisdiction, child welfare, gaming, and beyond.117 
Congress regulated even the internal governmental affairs of the tribes 
and passed legislation allowing the federal government to control 
tribes’ collection and disbursement of monies received from natural 
resource development and other sources.118 The effect of this era was 
Congress “treat[ing] . . . previously semi-independent Indian tribes as 
subject peoples.”119 
B. The Scope of the Modern Plenary Power Doctrine
In the early twentieth century, the Court used the Plenary Power 
Doctrine to validate congressional legislation without much inquiry at 
all, let alone searching judicial review.120 This period was considered 
to be the apex of Congress’s plenary power over indigenous Americans 
and their lands.121 Up to 1930, Congress mainly used this power to pass 
legislation that furthered the goals of diminishing tribal governmental 
114 Newton, supra note 4, at 221–22. 
115 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. 
116 Newton, supra note 4, at 222. 
117 Id. at 222–24.  
118 See id. at 223–24. 
119 Id. at 223. Perhaps nowhere has this change been more apparent than in the treatment 
of the most recently colonized indigenous peoples of the United States—the Kingdom of 
Hawaii and the various nations of what is now the State of Alaska. Natsu Taylor Saito, The 
Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human Rights in the Name of Sovereignty, 51 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1115, 1138–39, 1146–47 (2002). As the last indigenous peoples to be enveloped
into the United States, their entry was shepherded exclusively by Congress using its plenary
power. There were no treaties with these nations allowing them to preserve their
sovereignty, control their lands, access hunting and fishing grounds, or secure any of the
other guarantees that tribes in the contiguous forty-eight states had been able to secure.
Instead, Congress basically dictated the terms of entry using its plenary power to regulate
the entry of Native Hawaiian and Native Alaskan peoples and their land.
120 Newton, supra note 4, at 228. 
121 Id. 
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authority and assimilation of tribal members into nonindigenous 
American society.122 After 1930, Congress began to pass legislation 
that could be deemed beneficial to tribes and tribal members, enabling 
some restoration of tribal landholdings (albeit under tightly controlled 
circumstances) such as conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to hear 
claims involving a tribe as plaintiff and granting citizenship to all 
indigenous peoples residing within the borders of the United States.123 
In the 1940s and 1950s, Congress created the Indian Claims 
Commission, which gave tribes a forum in which to press land claims 
of the sort argued by the tribes in Lone Wolf and repeated throughout 
the country.124 During this time, the Supreme Court also finally 
recognized that individual tribal members had standing to sue in federal 
court under Article III of the Constitution, even in the absence of 
congressional authorization.125 This provided a federal forum in which 
tribes could hold the federal government accountable for its treaty 
breaches and other legal harms. 
Even when Congress passed legislation that ostensibly aided tribes 
or recognized tribes’ sovereign authority, the legislation was still often 
based on a principle that Congress possessed authority over tribes. The 
Supreme Court bolstered this congressional authority by affording 
extreme levels of deference to every congressional act relating to 
indigenous nations or peoples.126 Around the mid-twentieth century, 
however, congressional plenary power127 and the Plenary Power 
Doctrine128 diverged somewhat.129 The Court became slightly more 
amenable to the notion of tribes as independent sovereigns operating 
within the broader federal legal system, or slightly apart from it,130 
while Congress was often on a completely different page.131 After 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 228–29. 
124 Id. at 229. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 229–30. 
127 Congressional plenary power is the power of Congress to pass legislation derived 
from the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, the Property Clause, and other 
sources. See generally id. 
128 The Plenary Power Doctrine is the common law standard under which the Supreme 
Court reviews legislation Congress passed using its plenary power when that legislation 
relates to “Indians,” tribes, or related “affairs.” See id. at 215–16.  
129 Id. at 229–30. 
130 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (noting that tribal courts have 
authority over “[r]eservation affairs” and that “Indians” have a “right to govern 
themselves”). 
131 Judith v. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 18 (1995). 
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World War II, Congress initiated the termination of federal recognition 
for tribes by statute, which included ordering tribal assets, like the tribal 
land base, to be liquidated and “transferr[ing] jurisdiction over Indians 
to the states.”132 Under this congressional initiative, “[t]he loss of tribal 
territory and sovereignty was immediate and complete,” rendering the 
Supreme Court’s continuing recognition of tribal sovereign authority 
relatively meaningless.133 
In the modern era, Congress’s legislative efforts have aided or 
supported tribes more frequently than in the past, but even the most 
ostensibly beneficial legislation always seems to have at least one 
unintended consequence, if not more.134 After the Termination Era of 
the 1950s, Congress passed legislation aimed at restricting states’ 
abilities to legislate in Indian Country, protecting tribes from state 
regulation of liquor, state taxation, and other efforts at bringing Indian 
Country under the regulatory umbrella of the states.135 In the 1970s and 
1980s, Congress passed several statutes designed to aid amendments to 
major environmental statutes that included provisions for tribes to 
regulate their air and water quality.136 These legislative efforts have 
affected tribes and their members differently, depending on the time 
frame, the subject of the legislation itself, and the circumstances of the 
individual tribes and their members.137 The impacts of congressional 
legislation are not unimportant either, but the fact that Congress 
continues to legislate so aggressively with regard to indigenous nations, 
indigenous lands, and indigenous peoples demonstrates that 
congressional plenary power is not a relic of the historical archives but 
still an active source of federal law and federal authority.138 
Additionally, even though the Supreme Court now applies a greater 
level of judicial scrutiny to congressional legislation in the area of 
indigenous affairs, the Court continues to recognize congressional 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 18–19. 
135 Newton, supra note 4, at 230; see 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012). 
136 Kronk Warner, supra note 12, at 806–08. 
137 See Newton, supra note 4, at 233. Statutes like the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) have been particularly divisive, with some tribes embracing the opportunities that 
gaming brought to their communities and others opposing gaming due to the potential social 
problems it caused. Even within tribes, there has been a lot of discord, disagreement, and 
resentment over IGRA and what it brought to Indian Country. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 39, 56 (2007). 
138 See Newton, supra note 4, at 230–31. 
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plenary power over tribal members, tribal lands, and tribal 
governments.139 Today, the Supreme Court describes this as a 
constitutional, rather than extraconstitutional, power.140 As recently as 
2004, in United States v. Lara, the Court recognized that “the 
Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in 
respect to Indian tribes, powers that [the Court has] consistently 
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”141 The Court currently 
recognizes the textual sources of these broad general powers as the 
Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause.142 Indeed, in Lara, 
the Court stated that “[t]he ‘central function of the Indian Commerce 
Clause . . . is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the 
field of Indian affairs.’”143 As for the Treaty Power, the Court 
explained that although “[t]he treaty power does not literally authorize 
Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing 
the President, not Congress, ‘to make Treaties’ . . . treaties made 
pursuant to that power can authorize Congress to deal with ‘matters’ 
with which otherwise ‘Congress could not deal.’”144 
Although the modern Court applies the Plenary Power Doctrine 
more sparingly than in the New Deal Era, a majority of Justices on the 
Court today continue to view Congress’s underlying power over and 
relating to indigenous matters as “plenary.”145 Similarly, Congress 
continues to assert plenary power over indigenous peoples and their 
lands, perhaps in a more comprehensive manner than ever before in the 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 231. 
141 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). See, e.g., Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993); 
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71 
(1979); see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also WILLIAM C. 
CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he independence of 
the tribes is subject to exceptionally great powers of Congress to regulate and modify the 
status of the tribes.”). 
142 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); 
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); see also FELIX 
S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 209–10 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
Michie 1982) (1942); CANBY, supra note 141, at 11–12.
143 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added) (citing Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)). See also, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau 
of Revenue of N. M., 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982) (“broad power” under the Indian Commerce 
Clause); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (citing 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23) (recognizing Congress has “broad power” to regulate “tribal 
affairs” under the Indian Commerce Clause). 
144 Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)). 
145 See id. 
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nation’s history.146 The judiciary more closely scrutinizes 
constitutional challenges to these assertions of authority147 but still 
recognizes the nearly absolute authority of Congress in the particular 
areas of tribal land and tribal affairs.148 A few examples of judicially 
recognized congressional authority over tribal land and tribal affairs 
include legislation narrowing “the boundaries of a reservation without 
tribal consent or compensation”; a series of statutes divesting tribes “of 
all criminal, civil, or regulatory jurisdiction”; statutory amendments 
abrogating treaties; and statutes subjecting “tribal laws and 
constitutions to federal approval.”149 In the area of land rights, the 
statutes Congress has enacted include measures “requir[ing] the 
Secretary of the Interior to approve land sales and leases by tribes, and 
contracts obligating money held by the federal government but owed 
to the tribe.”150 Congress has also legislated to “abrogate . . . future 
interests in Indian lands granted by earlier statutes,” and “enlarge or 
decrease the class of beneficiaries of tribal trust funds or lands.”151 
Moreover, the Court has also recognized that “Congress may take one 
kind of tribal property, aboriginal Indian property, without paying 
compensation; it may, without consent, dispose of recognized-title 
tribal property under the guise of management and sell it at less than 
fair market value without liability, as long as the tribe receives some 
proceeds.”152 
At the same time, Congress has also exercised its authority to 
regulate tribes and Indian Country in ways that tribes have seen as 
beneficial.153 Given their beneficial value to tribes, many of these 
statutes were not directly challenged as outside the scope of Congress’s 
authority and thus were never directly subject to judicial review under 
146 See id. 
147 See, e.g., id at 201–07. 
148 Newton, supra note 4, at 234–45. As Dean Nell Jessup Newton explains that, 
“vestiges of the judicial attitude of nonintervention developed and nurtured in the plenary 
power era remain, especially in the areas of tribal sovereignty and property rights where the 
Court continues to rely on an inherent Indian affairs power of almost unlimited scope.” Id. 
at 233. 
149 Id. at 234–35. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 235. 
152 Id. 
153 See Fletcher, supra note 137, at 49 (discussing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012)). Courts even developed a canon of interpretation for such 
statutes, holding that they should be construed in favor of tribes. Venetie I.R.A. Council v. 
Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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the Plenary Power Doctrine.154 Some examples are statutes aimed at 
stimulating tribal economic growth, such as the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act;155 statutes aimed at rectifying disastrous congressional 
efforts in earlier eras, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act;156 and 
statutes that protect tribal cultural values, such as the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.157 A final series of seemingly 
beneficial legislative acts aimed at tribes were the environmental 
amendments of the 1970s and 1980s, giving tribes primacy over the 
regulatory structure of several major federal statutes if the tribes could 
satisfy the relevant statutory and administrative criteria.158 
As mentioned before, tribal governments, tribal members, and 
academics have viewed the latter examples of congressional plenary 
power as beneficial to tribal integrity and culture and even as 
supportive of tribal sovereignty.159 However, the effects of these 
statutes must, in this context, be divorced from the underlying legal 
authority supporting them. This is because the underlying premise for 
any modern legislation relating to indigenous peoples, their lands, or 
their cultures is that Congress still possesses constitutional or 
extraconstitutional authority over tribes and other indigenous nations, 
despite their legal status as sovereign domestic nations.160  
The continuing recognition of plenary power over tribal lands, tribal 
governments, and indigenous peoples more broadly means that they 
remain, to some extent, subject to Congress’s authority in the view of 
Congress and the Supreme Court.161 The modern Court’s support for 
congressional plenary power also undermines treaty protections and 
allows for Congress to control the political, environmental, and legal 
structure governing modern tribes.162 The judicial checks on 
congressional plenary power are generally limited to individual 
154 Indirectly, Justice Thomas has recently addressed the nature and scope of Congress’s 
plenary power over Indian affairs in a challenge under one of these statutes, although the 
majority was not directly reviewing the relevant statutes under this lens. Adoptive Couple 
v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 659–60 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (referencing the
majority opinion at 639–43).
155 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012). 
156 Id. §§ 1901–03. 
157 Id. §§ 3001–13. 
158 See, e.g., Kronk Warner, supra note 12. 
159 See id. 
160 Newton, supra note 4, at 233. 
161 See id. 
162 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–02 (2004); Newton, supra note 4, at 
233 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). 
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circumstances when individual tribal members allege facial challenges 
to statutes violating their constitutional rights.163 
That judicial support has seemingly encouraged Congress to 
continue to exercise broad powers over indigenous peoples. These 
powers are sometimes delegated through administrative agencies such 
as the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the EPA.164 When this cycle of 
congressional power and judicial acquiescence is combined with the 
inherent flaws in the principles of congressional plenary power, the 
Plenary Power Doctrine, and the judicial deference toward Congress 
and administrative agencies, the result is that many recognized tribes 
possess only partial, and possibly tenuous, control over their regulatory 
landscape, and unrecognized tribes possess none at all.165 The scope of 
modern plenary power is a reality that neither the framers, nor the 
tribes, could have ever intended or envisioned.166 
C. Inherent Flaws in the Plenary Power Doctrine
The legal flaws in the Plenary Power Doctrine are many and 
varied167 but can generally be grouped into three categories: (1) 
constitutional deficiencies, (2) violations of democratic governance 
principles, and (3) pragmatic considerations. Any one of the above 
categories calls into question the continuing recognition of 
congressional plenary power over indigenous peoples and their 
governments. But collectively, they present a compelling, 
comprehensive rationale for invalidating the principle of congressional 
plenary power and the corollary Plenary Power Doctrine altogether. 
The first two categories will be explored in Sections C1 and C2 below, 
and the pragmatic complications will be explored in context in Part III. 
163 Newton, supra note 4, at 242. 
164 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, §§ 5.04[2][b], 10.01[2][a]. 
165 See id. Add to that cycle the doctrines requiring deference to administrative agencies 
and the playing field is potentially pitted completely against tribes, depending on the views 
of the administration. 
166 Natelson, supra note 2, at 214–15. 
167 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 24, at 115. 
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1. Constitutional Deficiencies
The constitutional flaws in the Plenary Power Doctrine have been
documented in more than one hundred years of scholarly critiques.168 
They include the lack of an “acceptable, historically-derived, textual 
constitutional explanation for the exercise of any federal authority over 
Indian tribes without their consent.”169 Also, as Professor Matthew 
Fletcher has observed, “The Founders of the United States did not 
invite American Indian nations (or tribes) to the Constitutional 
Convention, nor did they ask Indian nations to ratify the 
Constitution.”170 Finally, the plain text of the Indian Commerce 
Clause—which is the most cited constitutional basis for congressional 
plenary power—does not support legislative efforts in matters affecting 
indigenous nations, their members, and their lands.171 
The leading treatise on federal Indian law, Cohen’s Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, describes the Indian Commerce Clause as “not 
limited to regulations of trade or economic activities, or laws that are 
interstate in character or impact.”172 According to Cohen’s Handbook, 
the Indian Commerce Clause is “broader in scope” than the Interstate 
Commerce Clause and has “become the linchpin in the more general 
power over Indian affairs recognized by Congress and the courts.”173 
The courts, and especially the Supreme Court, struggle to articulate a 
reason for the distinction between the two commerce clauses and the 
plain language fails to offer one.174 Some Justices have expressly 
critiqued the Court’s continuing recognition of plenary power in light 
of the lack of textual support in the Indian Commerce Clause.175 
Not only the plain language of the Indian Commerce Clause but also 
its historical context suggest that its application is limited to a much 
168 See generally Newton, supra note 4, at 196–97 (describing the history and 
development of the Plenary Power Doctrine and the Court’s use of the Doctrine since the 
ratification of the Constitution and continuing into the 1990s). 
169 Clinton, supra note 24, at 115.  
170 Fletcher, supra note 62, at 55. 
171 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[3]. The Indian Commerce Clause does 
indicate that Congress should properly exercise authority in the area of commerce with 
tribes, creating some authority to legislate in matters falling squarely within the domain of 
commerce, but not to the extent that Congress exercises authority currently. Id.  
172 Id.  
173 Id. 
174 See id. 
175 See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 n.5 (2016). 
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smaller scope of tribal activities.176 When confronting the scope of 
authority to afford Congress in the final ratified version of the 
Constitution, the framers deliberately took a general police power out 
of the Constitution and chose instead to limit Congress’s authority to 
the area of “commerce” and “with tribes” only.177 The text does not 
confer power on Congress to legislate in matters other than commerce 
or in a manner that intrudes within a tribe or indigenous nation.178 
Therefore, the extent to which Congress has exercised power over 
tribes, their members, and their lands “is not supported by . . . the 
original understanding of the Framers.”179 
This understanding comports with the general recognition at the time 
of ratification that tribes were separate sovereigns with separate 
territory and governed under separate laws.180 According to Professor 
Robert S. Clinton, “[Tribes’] inclusion in the Commerce Clause with 
two other sovereigns, foreign nations and the states, whose political 
existence the United States also had no power to destroy, reflects that 
conception of the power.”181 The extent to which the United States 
Congress had authority over tribes was limited to matters of trade, and 
arguably that authority was further limited to external trade 
regulation—in other words, Congress had the power to pass legislation 
ratifying trade agreements with tribes or regulating U.S. citizens and 
their ability to engage in trade with the tribes, but that authority did not 
extend to matters internal to the tribes.182 Instead, tribes possessed 
inherent sovereign authority and autonomy, which was respected by 
the earliest Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Indian Commerce 
Clause.183 
176 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.02[1]. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 Id. 
180 Clinton, supra note 24, at 147 (“At the time the Constitution of the United States was 
drafted, the Framers generally accepted the notion that the Indian tribes constituted separate 
sovereign peoples who were totally self-governing within their territory and who relied on 
the federal government solely for external relations, i.e., diplomatic representation with 
foreign governments and protection from foreign foes and citizens of the United States.”); 
see Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 55–56 
(1996). 
181 Clinton, supra note 24, at 147. 
182 Id. 
183 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23. “[The legislation relating to tribal 
criminal jurisdiction] concerns a power similar in some respects to the power to prosecute a 
tribe’s own members—a power that this Court has called ‘inherent.’” United States v. Lara, 
541 U.S. 193, 204 (2004) (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23). The Supreme Court to 
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In the modern era, scholars and Supreme Court Justices alike 
question the continuing scope of congressional plenary power over 
indigenous nations.184 Justice Clarence Thomas, in particular, declines 
to recognize the Indian Commerce Clause as a textual basis for 
anything beyond commerce. 
Congress is given the power to regulate Commerce “with the Indian 
tribes.” The Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate 
commerce with all Indian persons any more than the Foreign 
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce 
with all foreign nationals traveling within the United States. A 
straightforward reading of the text, thus, confirms that Congress may 
only regulate commercial interactions—“commerce”—taking place 
with established Indian communities—“tribes.”185 
Critically, Justice Thomas also stated that the power to regulate 
commerce in the Indian Commerce Clause is “far from ‘plenary’”186 
and that “Congress’ assertion of ‘plenary power’ over Indian affairs is 
also inconsistent with the history of the Indian Commerce Clause.”187 
Rather, according to Justice Thomas, 
[a]t the time of the founding, the Clause was understood to reserve to
the States general police powers with respect to Indians who were
citizens of the several States. The Clause . . . conferred on Congress
the much narrower power to regulate trade with Indian tribes—that
is, Indians who had not been incorporated into the body-politic of any
State.188
Yet, despite these constitutional flaws, Congress has continually 
invoked its power under the Indian Commerce Clause to regulate 
everything from “tribal cultural resources . . . [and] gaming in Indian 
country” to environmental regulation, wildlife conservation, energy 
projects, and matters as far removed from commerce as criminal 
jurisdiction, family law, and acceptable forms of tribal governments.189 
this day recognizes inherent tribal sovereignty but cabins it to “a tribe’s authority to control 
events that occur upon the tribe’s own land.” Id. 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 n.5 (2016); Clinton, supra note 24, at 
147. 





189 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 5.01[3]. See Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 
U.S.C. § 1377 (2012); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 
(2012); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (2012); United States v. 
Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (noting that text and legislative history of 
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A majority of Supreme Court Justices have declined to invalidate those 
congressional exercises, and the modern Court still uses the Indian 
Commerce Clause as the constitutional basis for the Plenary Power 
Doctrine.190 
2. General Democratic Principles: Consent of the Governed
One of the most fundamental principles underlying the governance
structure of the United States is that “all legitimate governmental 
authority derives from the consent of the people who have chosen to 
delegate only certain limited powers to the federal government (a 
theory often called ‘popular delegation’ or ‘popular sovereignty’).”191 
Indigenous nations were separate sovereigns at the time the United 
States was founded—their citizens’ allegiance lay with their own 
governments, not with the government of the United States, and that 
allegiance supported the inherent sovereignty of those indigenous 
governments. Tribal governments negotiated agreements resolving 
disputes with the U.S. government, states, and U.S. citizens via 
treaties.192 
Conversely, tribes played no role in selecting or designing the 
governance structure of the United States—they were simply not “part 
of the American polity.”193 As Professor Robert Clinton has noted, the 
“exclusion of ‘Indians not taxed’ from the census clauses of both 
Article I, section 2 of the Constitution and from section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” demonstrate this separate status.194 Tribes 
simply “were not subject to federal governance and had no 
representation or voice in its selection.”195 Instead, “they were 
outsiders, just like foreign nations.”196 
Congress’s exercise of expansive authority over indigenous nations 
does not adhere to the fundamental democratic principle that citizen 
participants validate governmental actions through consent. As 
numerous scholars have noted, “consent of the governed [was] a 
the Endangered Species Act indicate “that Congress intended to subject Indians to its 
prohibitions”). 
190 DUTHU, supra note 47, at 200. 
191 Clinton, supra note 24, at 115. 
192 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 530 (1832). 
193 Clinton, supra note 24, at 147. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 147–48. 
196 Fletcher, supra note 62, at 55. 
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cardinal principle of the founders.”197 Yet, the fact “that Indians were 
not citizens and could not vote” has never seemed persuasive enough 
to convince a majority of members of Congress, or the Supreme Court, 
that legislating in Indian Country to the extent that Congress 
historically has done is inherently undemocratic.198 Instead, “by 
concentrating on justifying federal power, the Court [has always] 
reinforced earlier precedents abdicating its role in accommodating the 
legitimate but competing interests raised by the federal government’s 
interference with tribal rights. Such accommodation was left to the 
political arena—an arena from which Indians were [historically] 
excluded.”199 In effect, the Court and Congress have been content to 
rationalize this congressional action based on a lack of consent to be 
governed. 
In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court “expressly justified the 
exercise of judicial review, in part on the ground that the act of the 
people of the United States delegating power to Congress in the 
Constitution constituted a superior and limiting delegation that controls 
the exercises of authority undertaken by Congress pursuant to the 
delegation.”200 This limited Congress from exceeding the scope of its 
authority under the Constitution and from creating laws with no 
constitutional authority.201 Under this principle, “[l]egislation enacted 
beyond the grant of the delegation of power therefore simply did not 
constitute valid or enforceable law.”202 
One theory of the early position of tribes as separate, independent 
sovereigns—which also explains their inclusion in the Constitution—
is that treaty negotiations were used as a means of transitioning tribes 
from being separate and independent to a status similar to states.203 
This theory is debatable, however, and the available historical records 
do not shed much light on its validity. From the start, “statehood for 
Indian tribes and inclusion of them within the federal union 
contemplated (1) the consent of the tribes through treaty and (2) 
representation in Congress as separate constituent Indian states within 
the union.”204 The early understanding “did not assume the exercise of 
197 Newton, supra note 4, at 216; see id.; Clinton, supra note 24, at 148–49. 
198 Newton, supra note 4, at 216. 
199 Id. 
200 Clinton, supra note 24, at 148–49. 
201 See id. 
202 Id. at 149. 
203 Id. at 126. 
204 Id. at 126–27. 
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direct federal legislative power over Indian nations without their 
consent or representation. Such proposals, therefore, were advanced in 
a manner consistent with the basic Lockean social compact notions of 
popular delegation that animated early American constitutional 
theory.”205 
In short, if popular ratification and consent formed the basis for the 
Constitution and gave it legal validity, the Constitution would not apply 
to entire populations that were deliberately excluded from its 
development and ratification.206 The Constitution should not govern 
peoples who did not take part in its development or adoption. 
Continuing to recognize constitutional authority for Congress to 
legislate in Indian Country, therefore, undermines the foundational 
principles of popular delegation and consent. 
II 
TRIBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: 
THE FLAWED COUPLING OF FEDERAL PLENARY POWER AND TRIBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
A. Overview of Cooperative Federalism and Environmental
Federalism 
The uncertain constitutional foundation for plenary power over 
tribes has produced similarly complex and challenging legal 
relationships in the area of environmental protection of indigenous 
peoples and management of their lands and natural resources. In the 
TAS provisions, Congress either delegated or otherwise recognized 
tribal authority to regulate air quality, water quality, drinking water, 
and mining reclamation, among others.207 Despite the seemingly 
expansive authority recognized in TAS provisions, a relatively small 
205 Id. at 127. 
206 At least one scholar raises the question of whether tribes ever consented to be part of 
the Union and concludes that “[i]f they did so at all, it was through the treaty process.” 
Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere Change 
in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 40 (2002). This would mean that “treaties 
are quasi-constitutional documents; they form the basis for the relationship between the 
United States and the tribes.” Id. at 41.  
207 Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Returning to the Tribal Environmental “Laboratory”: 
An Examination of Environmental Enforcement Techniques in Indian Country, 6 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 341, 349 (2017). 
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percentage of tribes has been able to assume primary authority to 
implement and enforce the federal statutes.208  
Environmental federalism, or the sharing of authority between the 
federal government and the states or tribes, has provided a framework 
for environmental regulation in the United States for nearly half a 
century.209 Under this system, Congress has been the primary legal 
driver of environmental law and policy, determining the nature and 
scope of environmental protections in various areas, while allowing 
states (and eventually tribes) to participate in a regulatory capacity if 
they meet certain minimum federal criteria.210 In other words, 
“Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the 
Commerce Clause,” but has chosen in certain circumstances “to offer 
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”211 In 
some senses, it is less of a choice than it may seem given that the federal 
government imposes baseline requirements, which states must meet or 
exceed if they wish to obtain and keep primacy under one of the federal 
statutes.212 
One impetus for this structure was a “long history of state failure to 
protect what had come to be viewed as nationally important 
interests.”213 The failures were not necessarily due to a lack of 
willingness by the states to regulate pollution or use of natural 
resources but because states imposed different standards and lacked 
constitutional authority to regulate interstate pollution.214 The failure 
of state regulations, combined with urgent requests from the regulated 
entities for an even body of federal law and regulation, prompted the 
208 Id. at 358 (“A previous survey of tribal environmental codes reviewed the codes of 
the 74 federally recognized tribes located within the boundaries of Arizona, Montana, New 
York, and Oklahoma to determine how many of these tribes possessed tribal environmental 
code provisions related to air pollution, water pollution, solid waste disposal, and 
environmental quality generally. As to the regulation of air pollution, the survey determined 
that only four tribes, or 5% of the survey group, enacted tribal code provisions related to the 
regulation of air pollution.”). 
209 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 719–20 (2006). 
210 Id. at 727–29; Royster & Fausett, supra note 7, at 618–20. 
211 Glicksman, supra note 209, at 726–27. 
212 Royster & Fausett, supra note 7, at 617. 
213 Keith S. Porter, Good Alliances Make Good Neighbors: The Case for Tribal-State-
Federal Watershed Partnerships, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 497 (2007) (quoting 
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995)). 
214 Glicksman, supra note 209, at 730–31. 
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federal government to enact legislation to provide a cohesive and 
coherent body of federal environmental law.215 
Through various statutes passed in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress 
instituted comprehensive and uniform standards in several areas.216 
These areas included air quality, water quality, solid waste disposal, 
toxic pollutants, drinking water quality, and protection of the “human 
environment,” more generally.217 The purpose statement of one of 
these statutes—the Clean Water Act—illustrates the delicacy required 
to ensure state participation, clarifying that despite the extensive 
federal role in overseeing water pollution control, “[i]t [was] the policy 
of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.”218 
Similar clarifications are found in the other statutes, like the Clean Air 
Act.219 
Despite recognition of a state role in the regulatory framework, the 
underlying principle of the TAS provisions is that Congress controls 
the regulatory landscape.220 In other words, where Congress has 
delegated authority to states, but the states cannot satisfy the criteria 
necessary to obtain primacy, Congress has named the EPA the default 
environmental regulatory authority over any subject covered by one of 
these statutes.221 Furthermore, the statutes authorize the EPA to 
develop the criteria by which the states can establish primacy.222 This 
has placed the EPA in somewhat of a supervisory role over the states 
215 Id.; Porter, supra note 213. 
216 Glicksman, supra note 209, at 728–31. 
217 Id. at 739–40; see Royster & Fausett, supra note 7, at 629. 
218 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012). 
219 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2012); see Glicksman, supra note 209, at 738. 
220 Glicksman, supra note 209, at 740 (“The federal pollution control statutes 
unquestionably put the federal government, acting through authority delegated to EPA, in 
the driver’s seat.”). 
221 Id. at 740–41. 
222 See id. Outside the area of pollution control, there is an even greater degree of federal 
control over standards governing protected lands, natural resources, and wildlife. Under the 
federal land management statutes regulating the management and use of protected places 
such as national parks, national forests, national wildlife refuges, wilderness areas, and 
others, the federal government retains significant authority and control, even if tribes 
possessed treaty rights guaranteeing them access or sovereign rights to those places and 
resources. Id. at 744–45. 
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for several decades, although this role is based on the constitutional 
principles of preemption that arise from the Supremacy Clause.223 
B. Environmental Federalism and Indigenous Nations
The framework of environmental federalism involving indigenous 
nations is limited to federally recognized tribes and, even more 
specifically, to the subset cohort of tribes that has satisfied statutory 
and regulatory criteria to obtain primary regulatory authority under 
certain statutes.224 Only 573 indigenous nations in the United States 
are eligible to apply for regulatory primacy,225 leaving perhaps as many 
as 200 out of the regulatory framework altogether, even though they 
might possess state recognition.226 A discussion of the federal rationale 
for including the 573 tribes on the official list and excluding the others 
is outside the scope of this Article, but enough sufficient scholarly 
criticism of the arbitrary and arcane process of recognition exists that 
it is at least worth mentioning as a starting point for the critique of 
patchwork environmental laws governing tribal lands.227  
For the federally recognized tribes to obtain primacy they must make 
a detailed showing that involves a demonstration of certain criteria.228 
Under the Clean Air Act, for example, tribes must show that they (1) 
“carry out substantial governmental duties and powers, (2) have 
authority over the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas 
within tribal jurisdiction, and (3) [are] capable of implementing the 
CAA requirements and applicable regulations.”229 If they can satisfy 
these criteria, the EPA awards them “Tribes as States” (TAS) status.230 
The statutes that include some form of TAS eligibility are the Clean 
223 See Scott C. Seiler, Federal Preemption of State Law Environmental Remedies After 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 49 LA. L. REV. 193, 203 (1988). 
224 JUDITH V. ROYSTER ET AL., NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 228 
(3d ed. 2013); Kronk Warner, supra note 207, at 350.  
225 See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United 
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,863, 34,363 (July 23, 2018). 
226 Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Federalism and the State Recognition of Native 
American Tribes: A Survey of State-Recognized Tribes and State Recognition Processes 
Across the United States, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 82–83 (2008). 
227 See, e.g., id. 
228 Steffani A. Cochran, Treating Tribes As States Under the Federal Clean Air Act: 
Congressional Grant of Authority–Federal Preemption–Inherent Tribal Authority, 26 N.M. 
L. REV. 323, 327 (1996).
229 Id.
230 Kronk Warner, supra note 207, at 350.
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Air Act;231 the Clean Water Act;232 the Safe Drinking Water Act;233 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act;234 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act.235 In addition, some lesser known environmental 
statutes “were amended to treat tribes and states substantially the same 
without a requirement that tribes seek ‘state’ status,” and others 
“generally also placed tribes and states in substantially identical 
positions.”236 Should eligible tribes not seek TAS status or fail to 
qualify, the agency with primary authority to implement and enforce 
all these statutes in Indian Country is the EPA.237 
The EPA separates the tribes into two large groups: (1) those with 
TAS status and approved tribally developed regulatory programs, 
which involve “an exercise of regulatory authority by the applicant 
tribe”; and (2) those with TAS approval “for purposes of administering 
an environmental regulatory program without an enforcement 
component, an environmental regulatory program with an enforcement 
component, or an administrative environmental function.”238 In the 
first group, the EPA notes that there are twelve tribes exercising 
regulatory authority under various Clean Air Act provisions, sixty 
tribes administering water quality standards under the Clean Water Act, 
231 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2012) (authorizing the EPA “to treat Indian tribes as 
States”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (2012) (authority of tribes to redesignate their lands); 
Cochran, supra note 228, at 326. 
232 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012) (authorizing the EPA “to treat an Indian tribe as a State”). 
233 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(a) (2012) (authorizing the EPA “to treat Indian Tribes as 
States . . . [and to] delegate to such Tribes primary enforcement responsibility” for certain 
programs); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(e) (2012). 
234 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (2012) (“Indian tribe shall be afforded substantially the same 
treatment as a State . . . .”). 
235 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a)(1) (2012) (The EPA may “delegate to any . . . Indian tribe the 
authority to cooperate in the enforcement of [FIFRA].”). 
236 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 10.02[1] (citing the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012), and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1983, 42 
U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)). 
237 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984) (“Until Tribal 
Governments are willing and able to assume full responsibility for delegable programs, the 
Agency will retain responsibility for managing programs for reservations (unless the State 
has an express grant of jurisdiction from Congress sufficient to support delegation to the 
State Government).”); see Memorandum from E. Scott Pruitt, Administrator, to All EPA 
Employees, on the Reaffirmation of the Indian Policy (Oct. 11, 2017).  
238 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRIBES APPROVED FOR TREATMENT AS A STATE (TAS), 
https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribes-approved-treatment-state-tas [hereinafter EPA TAS 
APPROVAL] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).  
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three tribes exercising two separate functions under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (related to public water system supervision and underground 
injection control standards), and four tribes administering three 
different sections of the Toxic Substances Control Act.239 The total 
number of tribes exercising full regulatory authority, however, is not 
the sum of those individual categories (despite the EPA’s posting of a 
“total” of seventy-seven tribes exercising TAS authority) because some 
tribes, like the Navajo Nation and the Southern Ute Tribe, have 
qualified for TAS status under multiple statutory provisions.240 
Therefore, for the Clean Air Act, as one example, the total number of 
tribes exercising authority over air pollution is actually seven, not 
twelve, and the total number of TAS tribes under every statute is closer 
to sixty, rather than seventy-seven.241 This adjusted total represents 
slightly more than .01% of federally recognized tribes. 
For the individual tribes that have qualified, the power that 
accompanies the TAS designation and authorization to implement a 
tribal program is broad. The Clean Water Act is the most expansive 
source of tribal environmental federalism, with sixty TAS tribes 
exercising regulatory authority over water quality in sixteen states.242 
It is also a useful illustration of a TAS provision. Under the Clean 
Water Act, the EPA has primary authority to administer and implement 
the statutory requirements, although the EPA can allow states and tribes 
to assume primacy.243 Section 518 provides that the EPA can “treat an 
Indian tribe as a state” in the area of setting water quality standards 
239 Id. 
240 E.g., compare id., with The Navajo Nation Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act 
of 2004, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit 4, §§ 1101–62 (2010), http://www.navajonation 
epa.org/Pdf%20files/NNAQCP-NavajoNationCleanAirAct_Final.pdf. The Navajo Nation 
exercises authority under section 110 and Title V of the Clean Air Act, as well as under 
section 1413 of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act. 
241 EPA TAS APPROVAL, supra note 238. The tribes exercising authority under the 
Clean Air Act are the Gila River Tribe, the Pechanga Band, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 
the Navajo Nation, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Mohegan Tribe, and the Southern Ute 
Indian Tribe. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Control of Air Pollution on Indian Reservations, 
46 ENVTL. L. 893, 922 (2016). 
242 See EPA ACTIONS, supra note 19 (containing a complete list of tribes located in 
Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Colorado, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, New York, and North Carolina); 
Charles G. Curtis, Jr. et al., Tribal “Treatment As State” Programs Under Federal 
Environmental Statutes: Key Provisions and Case Studies, 2015 WL 9194946, at *10 
(2015). 
243 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (2012); Robin Kundis Craig, Borders and Discharges: 
Regulation of Tribal Activities Under the Clean Water Act in States with NPDES Program 
Authority, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 9–10 (1998). 
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(WQS) under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System and 
with respect to enforcement of any resulting violations of those 
standards.244 The EPA has interpreted this statutory language not as a 
delegation but as statutory authority for tribes to carry out “federal 
programs within the scope of their inherent powers.”245 However, 
before tribes can receive TAS status, if their reservation contains fee 
lands, they must demonstrate the need to regulate water quality or water 
pollution on the fee lands consistent with the tribal health and economic 
well-being exception to the Supreme Court’s general prohibition on 
tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers in Montana v. United 
States.246 Otherwise, the Montana rule prohibits tribes from regulating 
nonmember activity on fee lands within a reservation.247 
Additionally, to receive TAS status, the Clean Water Act requires 
that a tribe must “ha[ve] a governing body carrying out substantial 
governmental duties and powers” and be “reasonably expected to be 
capable . . . of carrying out the functions to be exercised . . . .”248 More 
specifically, 
[t]he functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe [must] pertain to
the management and protection of water resources which are held by
an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by
a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a
trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an
Indian reservation.249
In addition, tribes must obtain TAS authority for each major section of 
the Clean Water Act to exercise corresponding authority thereunder.250 
These sections include “the setting of WQS for tribal waters” and 
“issuing water quality certifications, discharge permits, and wetlands 
244 Craig, supra note 243, at 10 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994)). 
245 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 10.03[2][a]. Because this is a matter of 
agency interpretation, it is possible that it could change, depending on the policy choices of 
the EPA administrator. It is far less complicated for an administrative agency to change 
course on a matter of statutory interpretation than it is for Congress to pass legislation 
amending the Clean Water Act and other statutes, making this recognition of tribal inherent 
sovereignty perhaps even more tenuous and less certain than it would seem. Also, the EPA’s 
interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s TAS provision as a recognition of tribal inherent 
sovereignty has been questioned and criticized in multiple judicial opinions. See, e.g., 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 
(1989); Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 1998). 
246 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
247 Id. 
248 Craig, supra note 243, at 11 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1), (3) (1994)). 
249 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (1994)). 
250 Id. at 12. 
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dredge-and-fill permits.”251 Thus far, all TAS approvals have been 
limited to the setting of WQS for tribal waters.252 
The second group of tribes the EPA includes in the TAS program 
are those tribes approved to exercise an administrative function under 
one of the environmental statutes but without authority to design or 
enforce a tribally generated regulatory regime.253 This group includes 
thirty-two tribes in fourteen states.254 Every tribe in this group 
administers provisions of the Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration Program, although none of these tribes have independent 
authority to develop performance standards that differ from EPA’s.255 
Also, the EPA can exempt sources it wishes to independently regulate 
directly, as it did with the Four Corners Power Plant and the Navajo 
Generating Station on the Navajo Reservation in 2004.256 Finally, the 
EPA retains enforcement authority under the Clean Air Act even when 
it has granted administrative authority to a tribe.257 For the .05% of 
federally recognized tribes that have obtained TAS status under the 
Clean Air Act, it has given them some role in the regulation of air 
pollution on their lands, but not complete regulatory authority, which 
would include enforcement power. 
Lastly, for statutes that do not mention tribal authority at all, the 
EPA’s position is that it possesses delegated authority to oversee 
implementation in Indian Country.258 For statutes that mention tribes 
and contain TAS provisions, the EPA assumes authority only if the 
tribe does not obtain primacy through an application process that 
requires the tribe to satisfy certain administrative criteria before being 
deemed capable of regulating the particular activity or pollutant.259 To 
date, and at least through the Obama Administration, the EPA has taken 
the position that it possesses the authority to interpret federal pollution 
control statutes in a manner that allows tribes to obtain primacy, 
although that is an administrative interpretation of a statute not 
251 Id. 
252 Id. (noting that WQS TAS “is powerful authority because ‘upstream’ jurisdictions 
must, when revising their standards, provide the attainment and maintenance of the 
downstream TAS standards”); EPA ACTIONS, supra note 19.  
253 EPA TAS APPROVAL, supra note 238. 
254 Id. (California, Washington, Idaho, Nebraska, Arizona, New York, Minnesota, 
Oklahoma, New Mexico, Kansas, Nevada, Wyoming, Wisconsin, and Oregon). 
255 Reitze, supra note 241, at 924. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Royster & Fausett, supra note 7, at 629. 
259 Id. at 629–30.  
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contained within the statute itself, and thus potentially subject to 
change.260  
III 
THE FLAWED COUPLING OF CONGRESSIONAL PLENARY POWER AND 
TRIBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 
Indigenous environmental federalism has several inherent and 
extrinsic limitations. To start, the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
Congress possesses such sweeping power over indigenous nations is 
inherently constitutionally flawed. It also makes for confusing 
precedent when the Supreme Court attempts to reconcile broad 
congressional power with a continual recognition of (also somewhat 
broad) tribal sovereignty. It would seem that one or the other of the two 
principles would or should have been cast aside, but the Supreme Court 
continues to recognize both (sometimes in the same opinion).261 
Another inherent limitation of the Plenary Power Doctrine and the 
underlying congressional plenary power, particularly in the context of 
tribal environmental federalism, is that relegating such broad power to 
Congress means that Congress can essentially change tribal 
sovereignty over the environment through legislation, which leaves 
tribes in a somewhat legally and politically tenuous position.262 For 
example, the Supreme Court has continually recognized that Congress 
has the power to abrogate treaties and infringe upon inherent sovereign 
powers.263 Although this method of congressional interference with 
tribal sovereign authority has not been frequent in the modern era, the 
fact that it is legally possible means that tribes have a somewhat less 
certain and less permanent legal authority to regulate their environment 
and that the authority they do exercise (pursuant to the delegations in 
the TAS provisions) is potentially legally subordinate to the authority 
of Congress. This result leaves tribes at the proverbial mercy of 
Congress and the executive branch in these areas, which is not the 
relationship that the Constitution seems to contemplate.  
There are also pragmatic limitations to tribal environmental 
federalism. An obvious limitation is that the entire environmental 
federalism structure applies only to federally recognized tribes, leaving 
260 See id. 
261 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199–200 (recognizing both tribal sovereignty 
and congressional plenary power). 
262 See id. at 200–04.  
263 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 10.01[1]. 
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numerous indigenous nations out of the framework altogether and 
therefore subject to state and federal regulations.264 Unrecognized 
nations do not have the legal right to opt in to the TAS provision 
framework because the federal government does not recognize their 
status as sovereign nations.265 Complicating matters even further, one 
aspect of Congress’s Plenary Power is the authority to recognize tribes, 
which gives Congress the power to determine which tribes are in and 
which are out of the environmental regulatory framework of the TAS 
provisions.266 
A further pragmatic limitation is that, before native nations can 
exercise authority under the TAS provisions, they must satisfy the 
administrative criteria developed by the EPA to obtain primacy.267 
Under the Clean Water Act, for instance, 60 out of 573 federally 
recognized tribes have  TAS status, and 44 of those have actually seen 
their water quality standards approved by the EPA.268 Under the 
remaining statutes, far fewer have been able to apply for or obtain TAS 
status, resulting in less than 1% of all federally recognized tribes 
possessing delegated regulatory power over their environment.269 Even 
tribes that have been unable to opt in remain subject to some federal 
regulatory authority. 
Yet another pragmatic concern is that states may be able to regulate 
fee lands within reservations or other areas designated as Indian 
Country under their delegated authority pursuant to the same federal 
264 See Mark D. Myers, Comment, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United 
States, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 277 (2001). 
265 See id.; see also United Houma Nation v. Babbitt, No. CIV. A. 96-2095, 1997 WL 
403425, at *1 (D.D.C. July 8, 1997). 
266 Myers, supra note 264, at 272. The executive branch, through the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, can also recognize a tribe, as can the judiciary. Id. Congressional recognition is 
somewhat rare; however, it is constitutionally within Congress’s powers to recognize tribes. 
Id. 
267 Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmental Law, 39 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 42, 61 (2014).  
268 EPA ACTIONS, supra note 19. There are now 573 federally recognized tribes, 
controlling more than 56.2 million acres of land in the United States. BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-
questions (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). This number increased after President Trump signed 
into law the Thomasina E. Jordan Indian Tribes of Virginia Federal Recognition Act of 
2017, Pub. L. No. 115-121, 132 Stat. 40 (2018). 
269 Kronk Warner, supra note 207, at 358; Kronk Warner, supra note 12, at 847–52. 
TAS programs have not been as effective as many had expected. As of early 2015, only 48 
of the then 567 federally recognized tribes had received TAS status under the Clean Water 
Act. Id. at 850–51. Professor Warner’s survey of tribes located in four states yielded only 
four tribes with code provisions covering the regulation of air pollution. See Kronk Warner, 
supra note 267, at 68. 
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statutes. This is controlled by the Montana v. United States decision, in 
which the Supreme Court held that the Crow tribe lacked authority to 
prohibit nonmember hunting and fishing on fee lands owned by 
nonmembers located within the Crow reservation.270 The only 
exceptions to this rule are for tribes that can demonstrate nonmember 
consent to the assertion of tribal regulatory authority; or when the 
exercise of tribal regulatory authority over the fee lands is necessary 
because the nonmember activity “threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare of 
the tribe.”271 In Montana, the Supreme Court held that neither 
exception was satisfied.272  
Like many other reservations, the Crow reservation is a 
checkerboard, containing a variety of different categories of lands, with 
only sixty-nine percent of the total land base held in trust for the tribe 
or tribal members.273 After the Montana decision, the tribe was 
divested of authority to regulate the other thirty-one percent,274 
potentially opening the door for state environmental regulation on those 
lands, even though they are within the borders of the Crow 
reservation.275 In other circumstances, such as for the Oklahoma tribes, 
the state has a congressionally delegated role in shaping the tribes’ 
environmental regulation and enforcement structure.276 As these 
examples show, even if it is only legally possible for states to regulate 
environmental quality in Indian Country, tribal authority is potentially 
undermined.277 
270 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). 
271 Id. at 565–66. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 548.  
274 See id.  
275 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 10.02[1] (“In general, states may exercise 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands only as authorized by Congress, and state 
jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee lands is constrained both by tribal rights to regulate 
nonmembers in order to protect core tribal governmental interests and by federal preemption 
of state authority.”); see also Porter, supra note 213, at 535 (“EPA may have the option of 
allowing states to include tribal reservations in their water programs. Federal preemption of 
state law applies when a federal law explicitly preempts state law or occupies the field to 
the exclusion of state law. When Congress authorized EPA to treat tribes as states, it 
preempted state jurisdiction over tribal reservations. However, there is no express language 
in the statutes providing for the designation of tribes as states that would deny EPA the 
option of allowing states to administer state-crafted regulations on reservation lands.”). 
276 Kronk Warner, supra note 207, at 357. 
277 Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
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A final flaw is that delegations of authority under discrete statutes 
are not comprehensive environmental enforcement strategies. As 
mentioned above, tribes must obtain TAS status under each statute and 
sometimes under discrete areas within the same statute. Therefore, a 
tribe that obtains Title V permitting authority under the Clean Air Act, 
but does not have any TAS status under the remaining sections of the 
Clean Air Act or any other statute, can implement environmental 
regulations only under its inherent sovereign powers. This might mean 
that, if the tribe cannot establish inherent sovereign authority over 
checkerboard lands under Montana, the tribe is reliant upon the EPA 
to protect its environmental quality, wildlife, and land base.278 
Moreover, even if a tribe’s reservation is 100 percent Indian Country 
(noncheckerboard), it still might be able to obtain approval only under 
one statute, allowing the tribe to regulate its water quality but not air 
pollution or underground injection of fracking fluids, for example. The 
tribal environmental federalism structure is a piecemeal approach to 
improving tribal environmental quality, at best. 
IV 
MOVING FORWARD: INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 
Working within the tribal environmental federalism framework, or 
outside of it, indigenous Americans steward the environment in 
comprehensive and effective ways.279 However, the tribal environ-
mental federalism framework is constitutionally flawed, unavailable to 
many indigenous nations, and not capable of addressing the totality of 
environmental problems that affect indigenous communities and their 
lands. Also, in some areas, indigenous environmental stewardship has 
already evolved beyond this framework, given that tribes are already 
using this sovereign authority to develop environmental laws and 
regulations best suited to accomplishing their particular environmental 
stewardship objectives.280 
Circumstantial yet compelling evidence that the framework is 
flawed is found in data showing that tribes able to obtain TAS status 
are clearly choosing other methods of protecting their environments.281 
Given the diversity and breadth of ecosystems contained within tribal 
278 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 557. 
279 See Kronk Warner, supra note 207, at 343. 
280 Id. 
281 See id. 
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lands and the diversity of indigenous nations within the United States, 
it would make more sense to let the environmental federalism structure 
pass into the annals of legal history when tribes are bypassing the 
structure anyway and when tribal solutions to the problems plaguing 
tribal lands might produce better and more individualized solutions in 
the long run.282 
In short, congressional plenary power over indigenous nations “is a 
house of cards ultimately built upon a constitutionally-flawed 
thesis.”283 This congressional power, and the corollary Plenary Power 
Doctrine,  may have served a limited, yet flawed, purpose at a time in 
United States history that is now long past. In the modern era, there is 
simply no place for extraconstitutional assertions of federal authority 
over indigenous nations, especially in the area of environmental 
protection. The time has come to acknowledge the flaws, fold the house 
of cards, and construct a model of indigenous environmental 
stewardship built on a foundation that will last. 
282 Id. at 345–46 (noting that tribes can be “more motivated to innovate and experiment 
with environmental law given factors potentially driving tribes that do not have the same 
impact on states”). 
283 Clinton, supra note 24, at 117. 
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